Here, too, is an extract from 'The Innocence of Kaiser Wilhelm II', which shows that, in fact, the British and the King were desperate to enter the conflict, and Belgium was merely a convenient excuse:
"In all his correspondence with his cousins, Britain’s
King George V repeatedly emphasised his desire for peace but, in July 2014, an
article appeared in the Daily Telegraph which
calls into question his sincerity. According to recently discovered evidence,
including a personal letter from Buckingham Palace, on August 2nd 1914,
the King summoned the Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, and told him directly
that Britain must participate in the war to prevent Germany from becoming the
most dominant force in Europe. When Grey observed that there was no justifiable
reason for Britain to do so, the King told him he must find one.
Throughout the crisis, Grey had remained ambiguous
in response to questions from Germany, Russia and France as to what role
Britain would play in the event of a European war. When Sazonov pressed the
British and French Ambassadors to stand by their Russian allies, the French
Ambassador, Maurice Paléologue, had responded affirmatively without hesitation
but the British Ambassador, George Buchanan, explained:
“I could
not hold out any hope of [Britain] making a declaration of solidarity that
would involve unconditional engagement to support France and Russia by force of
arms on behalf of a country like Serbia where no British interests were
involved.”[i]
When informed
of this conversation, Grey commented that this was the correct response, but
Buchanan was already eagerly trying to persuade his government to back the
Russians and he promised Sazanov that he would ‘make strong representations…in
favour of the policy of resistance to Germanic arrogance.’[ii] He was equally keen to ensure that Germany
should take the blame for the subsequent conflict, telling Paléologue, on 28th
July:
“The German
Government must be saddled with all the responsibility and all the initiative.
English opinion will accept the idea of intervening in the war only if Germany
is indubitably the aggressor...Please talk to Sazonov to that effect.”[iii]
The Germans
in general, and Wilhelm in particular, were desperate for an assurance of
British neutrality, and several approaches had been made to Grey to ascertain
his position and to discover under what conditions Britain might feel it was
necessary to take up arms. In view of the Anglo-French Entente, Bethmann asked
whether Britain would remain neutral if the Germans did not invade France, but
since this did not preclude an attack on French colonies, the British refused
to accept it.
On 1st
August, however, the Kaiser received a message from Prince Linchowsky, his
Ambassador in London, stating that Grey had told him that Britain would remain out of the conflict providing
France was not attacked. Wilhelm was so overjoyed that, without informing his Chief of Staff, he immediately ordered
a halt to the German advance towards Luxembourg, and sent a message to his
cousin, George, assuring him of his willingness to accept the proposal. To his
horror, however, George replied – in almost identical terms to those in which
he had written to Nicholas following the Russian mobilisation – that there
‘must have been some misunderstanding’ as the discussion between Grey and Linchowsky was merely an informal and hypothetical conversation
and had no significance.
On the same day, Linchowsky again asked Grey
if the British would remain impassive provided that the Germans did not invade neutral
Belgium. Grey refused to give that assurance, stating that Belgium might be ‘an important but not a decisive factor.’ On behalf of
the Kaiser, the German government then asked on what terms Britain would remain neutral, but, as the
British Member of Parliament, James Ramsey-McDonald, stated openly in the House
of Commons:
“Sir Edward Grey declined to discuss the
matter. This fact was suppressed by Mr Asquith and Sir Edward Grey in their
speeches to Parliament. When Sir Edward Grey failed to secure peace between
Germany and Russia, he worked deliberately to involve us in the war, using
Belgium as his chief excuse.”[iv]
Three days after stating that the invasion
would not be a decisive factor, Britain went to war in defence of ‘plucky
little Belgium.’"
[i]
Buchanan, Sir George My Mission to Russia
Vol. 1 (Cassell & Company Ltd. 1923)
[ii]
PalĂ©ologue, Maurice An Ambassador’s
Memoirs (G.H. Doran 1925)
[iii]
PalĂ©ologue, Maurice An Ambassador’s
Memoirs (G.H. Doran 1925)
[iv]
McGuire, James K. What Germany Could do
for Ireland (Wolfe Tone Company 1916)